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Abstract
The paper discusses a justification for a particular econometric
framework for analysing transitions into and out of employment in an
intertemporal context with uncertainty. The analysis extends the
models found in the literature by introducing a discrete choice
variable that is unobservable to the econometrician.
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1. Introduction 
Econometric models for labor supply in an intertemporal
setting have been considered by a number of authors. See for instance
MaCurdy (1982), (1983), Killingsworth (1984) and the references there-
in. Most of these studies, however, do not discuss the properties of
the latent variables that enter the model. That is, the choice of pro-
bability distributions for the unobservables is made ad hoc and, apart
from statistical diagnostic checks rarely any theoretical arguments to
support these choices are provided.
The main focus of the present paper is the problem of
characterizing the stochastic properties of dynamic models for labor
supply. Our theoretical point of departure is the theory for labor
supply in a life cycle context with uncertainty as developed by
MaCurdy (1983) and Blundel and Walker (1986). Within this framework
the individual is assumed to choose his/her -lifetime labor supply,
consumption and savings profiles by maximizing an expected lifetime
utility function subject to uncertain wages and interest rates. Speci-
fically, we extend the approach taken by Blundel and Walker (1 by
introducing a latent choice variable which we call "match". This
notion is similar to Tinbergen's (1956) concept of "job" A match
characterizes a certain "position" relative to labor market opportu-
nities as well as to non-market opportunities. A match is specified by
the tasks performed, associated with a certain market or non-market
activity, as well as the qualifications required to perform these
tasks. Thus within our extended decision framework the individual is
sUpposed to maximize utility with respect to hours of work, consump-
tion, savings as well as with respect to the matches, subject to the
economic budget constraint and the (unobservable) set of feasible
matches. Although the match variable is latent it serves as a fruitful
starting point for a theoretical justification of the stochastic
properties of the model. Some of these properties follow from a set of
plausible assumptions about the preferences. Other important assump-
tions are only maintained for the sake of tractability but they can,
to a certain extent, be tested empirically. One example of such an
assumption is the Markov property. Our theory does not imply that the
class of econometric models that govern the transitions into and out
of employment necessarily has the Markov property although it includes
the Markov model as a special case. However, provided panel data are
available this property can be tested.
Our econometric framework seems convenient for empirical
estimation and policy simulations. This is 'due to the particular
simple structure of the transition probabilities. Except for two
parameters these probabilities can be expressed by the marginal
probabilities of being employed or not at the respective ages.
The organisation of the paper is as follows: In Section two
the individual's decision model in discrete time and with uncertainty
is presented and in Section 3 the econometric model is developed.
Section 4 extends the model to account for taxes and in Section 5 we
discuss some theoretical implications of the model for the elastici-
ties with respect to the demand for labor. In Section 6 we present
some empirical results. Unfortunately, these results are based on the
assumption of a one period budget constraint. This is due to lack of
information about savings in our data. Accordingly, the estimation
results are not fully consistent with the theoretical framework
developed in the preceeding 'sections and they are only useful in this
context to the extent that the intertemporal allocation of wealth
between periods plays a minor role. Section 6 also contains simulation
results for the effect on transitions into or out of employment from
changes in the mean marginal wage, level of schooling and number of
children. .
. Theoretical assumptions 
The present approach extends the traditional set up by taking
into account the heterogeneity of the labor market with respect to
wages and non-pecuniary attributes of the jobs as well as with respect
to individuals choice opportunities. Although the heterogeneity is
unobserved by the econometrician it has nevertheless importance for
the choice of functional forms in the model. In particular, the
assumption about the unobservables become important when the purpose
is to estimate and test assumptions about structural parameters of the
model.
The econometric model presented below is based on the plausi-
ble assumption that some of the unobservables are choice variables.
Examples of such variables are type of job, schooling, household
production and sport activities. Our point of departure is that the
choice of the observable variables, like consumption and hours of
work, are not necessarily made independently of the choice of the
latent variables.
Similarly as in Dagsvik (1987) we associate with jobs and non-
market opportunities the attributes and the type of tasks performed as
well as the skills needed to perform certain tasks. The individual's
set of feasible latent opportunities depends on personal abilities and
degree of qualifications. The individual operate in an environment
where future wage rates, interest rates, prices as well as the set of
latent choice variables are uncertain. Let Ut 
(Lt' Ct ,zt ) be the indi-
vidual's utility as of period t where Lt is annual hours of leisure,
C is consumption and z is an enumeration of the latent choice vari-
able henceforth denoted "match". It is called match because it
identifies the tasks performed with certain jobs or non-market
activities as well as it identifies the particular qualifications
needed to perform the respective tasks. For a more general
interpretation we refer the readers to Dagsvik (1987).
The budget constraints that must hold in each period are given
by
(2.1).hidtz 	 +At' t< T
'
(2.2)
	
(1 + r )S t-1' 	 T ,
and
(2.3)
'
LB t< T
t 
where r 	 is the interest rate, B is the latent set of feasible
matches in period t, W
t
 (z ) is the real wage rate specific to the
 t
match zt , St is total real savings in period t, h = M - Lt is annual
hours of work, h
t
 S. M, and A
t
 is the wealth in the beginning of
period t. The set Bt is a function of the personal qualifications.
The individual is supposed to maximize expected lifetime
utility given by
(2.4) 	 E (1 +
j=t JJJJ
subject to the budget constraints where Q, is,the rate of time pre-
ference and tt denotes the subjective expectation operator con-
ditional upon information prior to t + 1. Implicit in (2.4) is the
assumption that utility is additively separable over time.
The optimizing problem above can be reformulated as a two
stage budgeting decision process as discussed by Blundel and Walker
(1986). The budget constraints can be reformulated as
(2.5) Ct + L ) = < T
and
T-1
(2.6) 	 E R.
j=t• J
where
- MW. z.)) = R
J 	 Ji 	 tt
= At 	+ MWt (z )
and
J 	 1 Rj. = . 1 1 + r.n
is the discount factor that converts income in period t to its
equivalent in period one. The individual's optimizing problem is
clearly equivalent to the following two stage decisions: In stage one
vt is kept fixed and he maximizes utility, Ut (Lt ,Ct ,zt ), with respect
to (Lt' Ct ,zt ) subject to (2.5) and (2.3). Because of the time separa-
bility assumption this is an optimizing problem that only de-
pends on the within period preferences, total incomes and wages,
provided the choice sequence {B.} does not depend on past realizations
J
of the choice process and provided we rule out the possibility of a
corner solution at the upper bound on hours of work. Here we assume
that Bt is independent of realizations of the choice variables outside
period t and that no one prefers to work the full amount of available
time.
In stage two the individual determines the sequence {1.},
J
j 	 t, that maximizes expected (remaining) lifetime utility subject to
(2.6).
Let Ut(w1,z) be the indirect utility function that corre-
sponds to the within period decision problem, i.e.,
U (w4.1.,z) = max U (L,11-Lw,z).
L<M t
If we assume that the utility function is quasiconcave in (L,C),
increasing in C and in L it follows that Ut (w,p.,z) is convex in w,
increasing in and the labor supply function conditional on
(p.,z) is given by Roy's identity. Let
(2.7)U 	 max U (W (z) ' 4,z).t(4) 	 zeB 	 t t 
and define
(2.8) 	 Vt (4 ) = E
where
E (1+e
j.t
tju()} .
J J
= ( I Lt 	 t+i• 	 -1
Thus in stage two the problem consists of maximizing (2.7) with re-
spect to lit subject to (2.6). Note that this poses a non-trivial
maximization problem because U.(14) is not necessarily continuous in 1.1..
J
This is so because
U. (11) J 	 J
where 	 i.(4) is the optimal choice of z E B conditional on 4.
J
When 4 changes then for certain values of 4 the optimal value of z
jumps since the set B is discrete.
In the next section we shall specify a random utility function,
U.(4), that is continuously differentiable apart from on a subset that
J
has probability measure zero (See appendix 1). As discussed beldW the
rationale for the randomness is that in addition to individual
uncertainty there may be a number of variables that influence the
individual choices but are unobservable to the analyst. Consequently
the utility function above is equivalent to a continuously differenti-
able utility function in the sense that their respective probability
laws are the same..
Let Vt (At) denote the indirect utility function that corres-
ponds to the maximization of Vt (4t ) subject to (2.6) 1 . Provided U (4)
is continuously differentiable with probability one it follows from
MaCurdy (1983) that At is determined by
-(2.9)
	 V (A )	 1 E 1(1 + r 	 )V 	 (A 	 )}.
	t t	 i+e 	 t+1 t+i t+1
Moreover
(2.10) V (A ) = Ut 	)
	
t t 	 t
where the bar denotes optimum values. Eq. (2.10) means that the
individual determines the level of the periods dissavings so that the
marginal utility of wealth in period t equals the expected value of
the discounted marginal utility of the next period's wealth where the
discount factor is (1 + r 1 )/(1 + e).t+
3. A structural probability model for transitions into and out of 
employment
The theoretical framework we have presented above differs from
other approaches in the literature in that we have introduced an
1 1n order to do that the individual must of course solve all th6 with-
in period optimizing problems, since V
t 
depends on U.(4 ) for j 	 t.
unobservable choice variable. Although this latent variable leaves the
theoretical analysis above essentially unchanged it has nevertheless
important bearings for the stochastic properties of the econometric
model.
The model we develop here is a dynamic random utility model
where the randomness is attributable to variables that are known or
uncertain to the decision-maker but unobservable to the econometri-
cian. Even if the decision-makers were operating in an environment of
perfect certainty the observed choice process would still be perceived
as random by the observer due to these latent choice variables.
The indirect utility function as of period t is assumed to
have the following structure
(3.1) 	 Ut (w,z) = v (w,4,T(z))e(z), z E Bt
where {T(z), e(z)} represents an enumeration of the points in the
Poisson process on(0,..)x(0,00) with intensity measure h(dt) 
6-(1/a-1 dx/a
for some finite measure k. 	 The function vt (w,4,T) is a deterministic
function that is increasing in w, 4, and is convex in w for fixed T.
These properties follow from the fact that e(z) does not depend on
(w ,4). The variables {T(z), e(z)} account for the variation in the
value of the unobservable matches that are not captured
observable variables that affect the preferences.
The specification (3.1) may be justified by
assumptions as demonstrated in Dagsvik (1983) and (1987).
assumptions that can be applied relies on a version
through the
theoretical
One set of
of Yellott's
(1977) axiom "invariance under uniform expansions of the choice set"
To explain the axiom let z 1 , z 2 ,... be an enumeration of the alternat-
ives of B and assume that the corresponding utilities u i Ut (L,C,z i ),
i = 1, 2,..., kt , are independent draws from the same distribution far'
given t, h and C. Now expand the choice set B by adding mk - m new
alternatives, z k.0.1 , 	 zkm, that have utilities, u k+i , u k+2 ,
...,u
km 	
that are independent draws from the same distribution as the
original utilites. Let Bt denote the expanded choice set. 	 Then the
axiom states that the distribution 2 of the stochastic process
2
By distribution mean the finite dimentional marginpl distributions.
{max U (L,C,z)}
zat
equals the distribution of
{max U (L,C,z)}
zeB
apart from a linear transform. In Dagsvik (1983) it is demonstrated
that this assumption implies that the joint distribution at arbitrary
points in time of the process
{max U
t
 (L C
'
 z)}
' 
zeB
is of the multivariate extreme value type. (See Galambos, 1978). The
class of stochastic processes with this property is called the class
of max-stable processes (cf. de Haan, 1984). de Haan (1984) demonstr-
ates that U (1_,C,z) (provided {max U (L,C,z)} 	 is continuous in
z t
probability) admits the representation
(3 .2) 	 U (L,C,z) 	 (L,C,T(z)) e(z)
which implies ( 3.1) where v
t 
s ... an indirect utility function that cor-
responds to the maximation of U subject to the within period budget
constraints.
The behavioral interpretation of the axiom is that when the
choice sets of the latent opportunities are expanded - uniformly the
average number of persons that rank the combination (L 1 ,C 1 ) above
(L i ,C i ), 2, 3,..., (say) remains unchanged. This is 'a reasonable
assumption because it is an acknowledgement of the fact that uniform
expansion does not alter the "aggregate" 	 relative__ preference
evaluations of the observed alternatives 	
.
(L
i
 C.) provided the popu-
lation is 'large
Next let us consider the specification of the systematic term,
vt (w,4,T), of (3.1). We shall assume that
(3.3) 	 vt (w,4,T) 	 pt ( 4 ) y ( w,T) Kt(w,4,T)
where
Kt (w,4,T) 	 1 when (w,4,T) E Dto otherwise
and p (4) and y(w,T) are suitable functions. The presence of the func-
tion Kt implies that the individual has zero utility assigned to
matches for which
(W(Z),4,T(Z)) E D i. .
The behavioral interpretation of the set D
t 
is that the individual
only make utility comparisons from the subset of opportunities with a
"suitable" combination of wages W(z), total income, 1,and the matching
variable, T(z). The set Dt is of course unobservable and is treated as
a random variable. When (w,4,T) E Dt the structure (3.3) implies that
the (match-specific) indirect utility is multtplicatively separable in
wage and total income. This assumption is made for mathematical
convenience but it is less restrictive than it appears at first glance
because the indicator K is not separable in t, w and 4.
Now define the match-specific reservation wage, W (4,T), by
(3.4)	 v(W(4,T)1,T) = U t (M,4,T).
The match-specific reservation wage classifies the feasible matches in
two categories, namely
and
Bit 	(z1 z e
B
2t 	
{zI z-E
, 	 (Vgz ,4 ,T(z)) = 1, W(z)
	 W 	 'T(z))}t t
(W(z),4t ,T(z)) = 1, W(z)
	 W: tit ,T(z))1.
Note 	 that
	 the 	 particular
	
specification 	 (3.3) 	 implies that
Wt (4t' T(z)) 	 W (T(z)), i.e., W (4t' T(z)) does not depend on t nor ont 
4t . The set B it is the set of all matches the individual considers
and which he finds suitable for market activity. Similarly, B2t is the
set of matches which are found unsuitable for work. This set also con-
tains the pure non-market matches, i.e., matches for which the wage
rates are zero.
Also define
jt
The stochastic processes, {Zi (t)}, j 	 1,2, are clearly independent
since Bit n B2t* 0 (the empty set) and it can be demonstrated that
they belong to the class of max-stable processes. Z1 (t) is the
indirect utility of working at time t while Z2 (t) is the utility of
not working.
Let {J(t)} be the process that describes the individual's
choice history, i.e., J(t) . 1 if the individual (woman) is employed
in period t (age)' and J(t) 2 if the individual is not employed in
period t. We assume that there are no transition costs nor true state
dependence effects, i.e., we assume that the preferences are not
influenced by past labor market history. Accordingly, the probability
law of {J(t)} is completely determined-by the processes {Z.(t)} since
J(t) 	 j if and only if Z(t) = max
k Zk (t) for j 	 1,2. In generalJ
the process {J(t)} will not have the Markov property. However, pro-
vided the opportunity sets, Bjt 	 are nondecreasing
3
 then {J(t)}
becomes 	 an 	 inhomogeneous 	 Markov 	 chain 	 (See Dagsvik, 1987).
Recall that the Markov property is expressed as
PO(t) 	 nl j(tn- ) =
	 J(t ) = 1 1 }
P{J(tn ) i J(t 	 i 	 }n 1 	 n-1 	 n-1
where t
k 	 1,2,...,n.
< tn are arbitrary points in time and i k 	1,2,
It is in fact possible to test the Markov property even
if only observations at two points in time are available, because the
joint probabilities of being in state i in period t 1 and in state j in
period-t2 , 1,3 1,2, take a particular form when {J(t)} is generated
from max-stable processes. Here we shall simply assume that {Bt} isj
nondecreasing and examine the implications of this assumption. One
reason for this assumption is that our data does not contain all the
relevant variables that are needed for a rigorous test of the Markov
3 It •is possible to relax this assumption.
1 0
(3.5) 	 Z.(t) . max vt (W(z),T(z)) e(z), j . 1,2.zeB
property..
Let p.(t) and P( s,t) be the marginal probability of being inJ 	 ij
state j at time t and the transition probability of being in state j
at time t given that state i was occupied at time s, respectively,
1.■
.et ,
p.(t) = P{J(t) 	 j} =P{Z.(t) 	 max 	 Z (t)},
3 	
k=1,2 	
k
Plj..(s,t) = P{J(t) = il J(s) = i}
P{Z.(t) = max 	 Z (t)I Z. 	 = max Z s)}.
k=1,2 	 k 	 i 	 k=1,2 k
Let Glt(w) be the expected fraction of feasible market matches for
*which the wage rate W(z) satisfies W(T(z)) < w(z) < W and let
Elvt (141(z),4t ,T(z)) a l W(z) = w, w > W*(T(z)), z e Bt},
u 2
	E vt (W*(T(z)),4t ,T(z)) I W(z) 	 W*(T(z)), z E Bt}.
and assume that the density, 1 (w) off G it( w) exists. Moreover, let
P i (t,w) denote the joint density of realized wage and labor market
state one in period t. By Dagsvik (1987) it follows that
11
(3.8)
	 P ( ,w) 
lt 	 It(w) g (w) g Ot  
ty>0 t(
y) g lt (y)dy + g 2t 2t •
(3.9)
g u2t 2t 
t
y>0
I ult ( Y ) glt ( Y )" g u2  2t
_u
The interpretation of u,
 g
	 is as follows: g 	 is the pro-
jt jt 	 Ot
bability that a randomly selected match has positive wage rate. We may
interpret got as a demand parameter because it is the fraction of
available matches that are job-opportunities. g
2t 
is the probability
that a match is feasible but unsuitable for work where unsuitable
means that the wage is less than the corresponding reservation
wage (match-specific). Let
and
ult = S1(w) ult(w)dw.
ult is the mean indirect utility across all feasible and suitable
market matches while u2t is the mean indirect utility across all
feasible matches that are unsuitable for work. Obviously we have
g2t 	 1 	 gOtg lt
so that
(3.10) g g uOt lt lt 
u2t + (u lt - u2t )g t lt
Several cases of textbook models emerge as special cases of
(3.8) and (3.9). When a 	 0 	 then u
lt 
(w) -• 1 and u 2t -4.1 so
that (3.10) reduces toSimilarly (3.9) reduces togotglt • 	 -2t
which is the probability that the match-specific reservation wage is
higher than the corresponding wage rate. Thus this case corresponds to
the case where only the wage rate associated with a match matters.
Another special case is obtained when the wage rate distribution is
degenerate. Then (3.8) becomes
t,w ) -
u (w)g*lt 	 t 
(w )g* + (1-g* )u2t
when w w* and zero otherwise, where
g* = Pfw*>W*(T(z)),za
and p1 (t,w) is the probability of being in state one in period t when
all the_matches have the same wage rate (w ). It is reasonable to
interpret
(t,w*) 	 u 	 (w*)lt
t^* 	 lt (wflg*t + (1-gyu2t
as the effect of the heterogeneity due to non-pecuniary attributes on
the propensity towards work. Specifically, it expresses the
probability of working when all the wages are equal to w* given that
12
w* > W*(T(z)) and that zEB
t 
. In other words it is the con-
ditional probability of working given that the matches have wages that
are acceptable for work. In the textbook case p* 1 (t,w*)/g* reduces to
one while in the general case it may be close to zero because the
nonpecuniary attributes of the non-market matches may be significantly
more attractive than the corresponding attributes of the market
matches.
Note that the framework above permits that be correlated
with the preferences through the "matching" variable T(z). When lit and
T(z) are independent then g2t and g lt (w) are independent of lit . Other-
wise they depend on tit .
By applying the results of Dagsvik (1983) it can be proved
that (see appendix 2)
(3.11a) ..(s,t)
	
b(s)
p 4 (t)(1 - j
4 	 FITT-
n(s) -n(t)),
(3.11b) p..(s,t) = i - p..(s,t11 	 1,3
where n(t) is a positive function of t and
(t) .ggu 	 b(t)1 	 Ot lt lt' 	 2 	 2tu2t*
In order to secure non-negative transition probabilities, n(t ) must
satisfy the condition
log b(t) + n(t) k log b.
J
(s)
	 n(s)
for j 	 1,2, and all s 	 t. In continuous time the corresponding
transition intensities are given by
'.(t) = p.(t)(
	
b(
nitt) + j
-t) ) . 	 i0j
iJ 	 J 	 FTET
J
i i ( ) 	 -k i (t ) , 	 i o J.
At this point we like to focus on a number of remarkably
tractable properties of the model. First, consider the model in a pure
probabilistic context. Recall that the choice process (J(t)) is an
inhomogeneous Markov chain. In principle, an (inhomogeneous) Markov
chain is fully characterized and specified through the transition
intensities. From the transition intensities the transition
probabilities for transitions between time s and time t can be
13
calculated by means of the Kolmogorov differential equations. However,
in practical empirical work this is in general a formidable task
because the solution of the Kolmogorov equations as functions of
general transition intensities is very complicated. (See Singer
(1982)). Now consider (3 . 11) and (3.12). Notice first that a
parametrization that is equivalent to specifying the transition in-
tensities, X(t) , is to specify b.(t)expn(t), j 	 1,2, because there1J	 J
is a unique correspondence between bi(t)expn(t), X i (t) and A.21 (t). In
fact we have
t
b(t)e1(t)
	 f x..(x)e A(x) dx + 	 i 0 j
0 
IJ
where
A(x) = s( x 1 2 (Y )
	
21 (y))dy
and c 	 c 2 ard constants such that c 1+ c
2
 - 1. Consequently
'
 this
 
reparametrization
	 represent no restriction of the modell 	 The
reparametrized version also admits an appealing structural inter-
preation in terms of the individual's decision rule.
Now assume that
n(t) 	 Ot
where O > 0 is a constant. Then it follows from (3.12) that when
bj W does not depend on t then the chain Mt)} becomes homogeneous,
because the transition intensities are then constant. The
autocorrelation function of {Z3 (t)} can be proven to be an increasing
function of
bj (s) e -e(t-s)
b(t)
J
4 
This is only true in two state case. In the multistate case the
corresponding version implies strong restrictions.
14
15
at time s and t, s 	 t. Thus, when 0 is large the temporal variation
in the unobservables that influence utility is large and 	 the
transition probabilities are high. Conversely, when 0 is close to zero
and b(t) changes little over time, then the utility processes
{Z
J
.(t)} are strongly autocorrelated and the transition probabilities
are close to zero. Consequently, 0 is a parameter that measures the
temporal stability in the unobservables that affect utility. In
accordance with Heckman (1981) we may call 0 a habit persistence
parameter. Thus when 0 is large there is little habit persistence
while when 8 is small the habit persistence is strong.
4. Extension to account for progressive taxes 
MaCurdy (1983) and Blomquist (1985) have shown how the
intertemporal labor supply model can be extended to cover the case
where the tax function has a particular structure. Let Y denote the
tax function and assume that
(4.1) 	 = Y(h W(zt ), r S )
The important feature of (4.1) is that it does not depend on earnings
in periods outside period t. Moreover, we shall assume that Y is
differentiable. Let
m(h) = W(t) - 1 Y(htW(2t ) '
be the marginal wage rate and
I*
tt) 	
I + h t W ( ti ) 	 m (ht )ht - Y(ht V(i ), tt)t 	 t
where al 	 denotes the partial derivative with respect to the first
component. Conditional on the optimal values 	 and r la> the withint 	 t t
period t constraint is
(4.2) 	 Ct 	htWrit)	 It - Y(iltW(Te ), 	 ).
As is well known the within period optimizing problem subject to (4.2)
is equivalent to the optimizing problem subject to the linearized
version
(4.3) 	 Ct + Lm(t t = 11*t (h )' t T
16
where
41,t ( ht ) = ' *t ( ht ) 	mmt ( ht ) .
Thus the within period constraint (4.3) is completely analogous
(2.5) with 14(zt ) and I.Lt replaced by mand ti* t , respectively.
5. 	 Theoretical implications for the elasticities with respect to 
changes in the demand 
The model framework developed above implies that we can derive
some properties of the model without having estimated the parameters.
In partipular we shall study the effect on p.(t) and p. (t-1,t) from
J 	 lj
changing the mean wage and the demand parameter g ot . From (3.10) we
get
(5.1) 8log pp) 	 p(t ) 	 2t 
alog 	 =g =2t 2t 	
(	 - u 	 g
lt 2 	 t lt
This expression implies that
(5.2) u2t < 	
alog pi(t)
	 when 	 u 	 u1 	 2t  
lt 	 °g got 
alog p i ( t)u 2t 	 when u 	 < u
u lt 	 alo g got
The inequalities (5.2) and (5.3) tell us that the relative impact from
increasing the demand for labor is greatest when the mean utility for
work is less than the mean utility for leisure.
From (3.11a) we get
(5.4)
	
alog p 21(t-1,t)
	
alog p i ( t) 	 p (t)
alo g gOt
	 alog got 	 p21 (t-1,t •
Eq. (5.4) implies that
(5.5) /1 21 (t-1,t)alog 	 alog pp) 
alo g got 	 810 g gOt
(5.3) lt 	 2t'
17
because 13 1
	> P21 (t- 1,t) . Similarly it is straight forward to show
that
(5.6)
	 alog P2 (t) 	 alog p 2 (t-1,t)
alo 
got
	 al°g gOt
Thus by (5.5) and (5.6) the relative impact on p..(t-1,t) from a1J
change in g 	 is always greater (in absolute value) than the corre-
Ot
sponding impact on p..(t). Eq. (5.4) also implies that when 8 -.01J
then the right hand side of (5.4) tends towards infinity. Note that
this result depends crucially on the assumption that 8 does not
depend on got . However, we have not been able to provide theoretical
arguments to support this assumption. When 8 is small then there is
little variation over time in the unobservables that affect the
utility processes, {Z.(t)}, j 	 1,2 (habit persistence). Thus (5.4)
J
tells us that the relative impact on transitions is large when the
habit persistence is strong.
. Empirical results for the case with one period budget constraints. 
In this section we present some empirical results based on
data from the norwegian labor force survey ,1979-1980 , and the level
of living survey, 1980. Unfortunâtely,these data contains no
information on savings and we are therefore unable at this moment, to
estimate a full life cycle model. The estimates can at most, be
interpreted within a one period budget framework. Since our data are
insufficient in order to estimate the life cycle model we have chosen
to estimate a special case of (3.11) since our purpose is to focus on
the general approach rather than rigorous estimation and testing.
From (3.11) it follows that an alternative expression for the
transition probabilities is
(6.1a) 	 p 3 (st) 	 p3 (t) - p
J
.(s)g(s,t) 	 i#j1 
and
(5. lb) 	 p..(s,t) 	 p.(t) - p.(s)g(s,t) + g(s,t)
where
g(s, t = (b i
( s)+b2 (s) le-n (t n(s)
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b 1 (t)+b2 (t)
The special case we consider is obtained by letting a -00 (see
page 12) which corresponds to the textbook case in which utility is
concave in leisure and consumption. In this case
u lt = u2t = 1, P l (t) = gOtglt' P2 (t) = 2t
and the transition probabilities reduce to
-(6.1a) 	 p..(s,t) = p.(t) - e-e(ts) 	s , i0 j1J 	 j
(6.1b)
where 8 must satisfy
"2t
-e(t-s)= p.(t) - e
2t 	 0
dt
-8(t-s)+ e
in order to secure positive transition intensities.
The estimation is performed in two steps and two data sets are
used In the first step a cross-section of 1205 married women aged
16-67 years from the level of living survey is applied to estimate the
probabiliy of working, p i (t).
The probability pp)
	 g g is specified as a logitOt lt
function of age, age squared, number of children less than six years,
number of children between 6 and 16 years, husbands income minus tax
and the marginal wage rate at zero hours of work.
The wage rate is predicted from an estimated wage equation
depending on ye ars of schooling, age and age squared.
The estimation and data are reported in another study (Dagsvik
et al (1986)) but for the sake of completeness we also present the
estimates here in table 1 below. Standard errors are given in
Parenthesis.
Tabl‘ 1. Estimates of the parameters of the wage equation and the
probability of working
(Survey of level of living 1980)
Variable Estimate
Constant 2.1090
10.2582)
Years of schooling 0.0662
(0.0088)
Age 0.0302
(0.0106)
Age squared/100 - 0.0329
(0.0128)
Constant -8.894
(1.367)
Age 0.3045
(0.0448)
Age squared/100 -0.3876
(0.0534)
Number of children
0 	 16 years old -0.2219
(0.0910)
Marginal wage 1.580
(0.251) 	 .
The remaining parameter to be estimated is G. In order to
estimate 9 we need individual observations for at least two points in
time, . We have applied data from the labor force surveys at two
successive years (1979 and 1980) for this purpose. Unfortunately the
labor force survey provides no information on wage and income
variables nor number of children less than six years. We have,
therefore, estimated a reduced form version on the basis of the labor
force surveys and compared it with the corresponding reduced form
version obtained in step one by applying the level of living survey.
The parameter estimates are displayed in table 2.
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Table 2. Comparison of estimates of the (model) parameters based on
data from the survey of level of living and the labor
force survey, respectively.
Variable
Estimate
survey of level
of living
Estimate
labor force
survey
Years of
schooling 0.105 0.167
(0.020) (0.030)
Age 0.352 0.296
(0.045) (0.021)
Age squared - 0.440 - 0.357
100 (0.054) (0.028)
Number of
children 0.222 - 0.290
0-16 years (0.062) (0.050)
Habit Per- - 0.333 - 0.332
sistence (e) (0.026) (0.027)
First we have estimated reduced form coefficients except 9 on
the basis of the level of living survey and we have estimated 9 from
the labor force survey data. (First column).
In the second column we report the results from estimating all
the parameters by the maximum likelihood procedure on the basis of the
labor force survey data. We can conclude from the two data sets that
the parameter estimates are not significantly different. In order to
check whether or not the habit persistence parameter depend on
individual characteristics we have also estimated a version where 0 is
specified as a linear function of age, number of children and years of
schooling. However, the estimation results indicated no dependence on
these variables. These results must, nevertheless, be interpreted with
caution because one important variable, namely husbands income, is not
included here.
In order to illustrate the heterogeneity across different
person groups we report the predicted probabilities of working in
table 3. In table 4 and 5 we present predicted one year transition
probabilities (reduced form) for transitions into and out of
20
employment. These results are obtained by using (6.1) and keeping the
explanatory variables (except age) constant throughout the year.
Table 3. The Probability of being employed by age, education,number of children and husbands income.
Years 	 of 	 schooling: 9 18
Number
ofchildren
0-16years
Age 20 25 30 35 40 45 25 	 30 35 40 45
Husbandincome
(NOK)
50 .49 	 .67 .78 .83 .85 .83 .84 	 .90 .93 .93 .93
100 .39 	 .58 .70 .77 .79 .77 .78 	 .86 .89 .90 .90
, o 150 .29 	 .47 .61 .68 .71 .68 .69 	 .80 .85 .86 .85
200 .19 	 .34 .48 .56 .59 .56 .57 	 .70 .76 .78 .76
50 .43 	 .62 .74 .80 .82 .80 .81 	 .88 .91 .92 .91
100 .34 	 .52 .66 .73 .75 .73 .74 	 .83 ,.87 .88 .87
150 .25 	 .41 .55 .63 .66 .63 .64 	 .76 .81 in .82
200 .16 	 .29 .42 .50 .53 .50 .52 	 .65 .72 .74 .72
50 - 	 .57 .70 .76 .76 .76 .77 	 .85 .89 .90 .89
100 - 	 .47 .60 .67 .70 .68 .69 	 .80 .85 .86 .85
150 - 	 .36 .50 .58 .61 .58 .59 	 .72 .78 .80 .78
200 - 	 .25 .37 .45 .48 .45 .46 	 .60 .68 .70 .68
50 - 	 .51 .65 .72 .74 .72 - 	 .82 .87 .88 .87
100 .41 .55 .63 .66 .63 .76 .81 .83 .81
150 - 	 .31 .44 .52 .55 .52 .67 .74 .76 .74
200 - 	 .21 .32 .40 .42 .40 - 	 .54 .63 .65 .63
,
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Table
	
One year transition probabilities for transitions into
employment when no change in the observable character-
istics (except age) occurs.
Husbands
income
(N0K) 50.000 100.000 150.000
Number
of
children
Years of
school-
ing 9 18 9 18 9 18
0-16
years
 Age
20 .17 - .14 - .11 -
25 .21 .25 .19 .24 .16 .22
30 .23 .26 .21 .25 .19 .24
O 35 .24 .26 .22 .25 .20 .24
40 .24 .26 .22 .25 .20 .24
45 .23 .26 .21 .25 .19 .23
25 .18 .24 .16 .22 .12 .19
30 .21 .25 .19, .24 .16 .21, 35 .22 .25 .20 .24 .17 .21
40 .22 .25 .20 .24 .17 .21
45 . 21 . 25 . 19 . 23 . 16 . 21
Table 5. One year transition probabilities for transitions out of
employment when no change in the observable characteristics
(except age) occurs.
.
Husbands
income
(NOK)
50.000 100.000 150.000
Number
of
children
Years of
school-
ing 9 18 9 18 18
0 - 16
years
Age
•
, .
20 .11 - .14 - .17
25 .07 .03 .10 .05 .13 .07
30 .05 .02 .07 .03 .10 .05
O 35 .04 .02 .06 .03 .08 .04
40 .04 .02 .06 .03 .08 .04
45 .05 .02 .07 .03 .10 .05
,
25 .10 .05 .13 .07 .16 .09
30 .07 .03 .10 .05 13 .07
35 .06 .03 .08 .05 .11 .07
40 .06 JD .08 .05 .11 .07
45 .07 ..03 .10 .05 .13 .07
In table 6 we have computed elasticities of the transition
probabilities into employment with respect to the mean marginal "wage.
The table shows that the impact of wage changes is largest for young,
low educated women where the husbands earnings is 150 000 NOK.
Conversely, the effect is small for women age 30-45 with 18 years of
schooling and husbands income equal to 50 000 NOK.
Table 7 shows the effect of schooling. In our model schooling
enter the model through the marginal wage function and it is assumed
that the preferences are not influenced by the length of schooling. As
would be expected, table 7 .show a similar picture as table 6. For
example, the proportion. of 25 year old women with 9 years of schooling
and husbands income equal to 100 000 NOK that enters employment is
predicted to increase by 0.14 when the woman takes an additional
year of schooling.
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Table 6. The elasticities of the one year probabilities for
transitions into employment with respect to the mean
marginal wage.
Husbands
income
(NOK)
50.000 100.000 150.000
,
Number
of
children
Years of
school-
ing 9 18 9 18 9 18
0 - 16
years
Age
20 2.3 - 2.7 1.2 3.1 -
25 1.7 0.9 2.1 1.2 2.5 1.6
30 1.2 0.5 1.6 0.8 1.7 1.1
o 35 0.9 0.4 1.3 0.8 1.7 0.9
40 0.9 0.4 1.2 0.8 1.9 0.9
45 1.0 0.4 1.3 0.8 1.9 0.9
25 2.1 1.2 2.5 1.6 3.0 2.0
30 1.6 0.8 2.0 1.1 2.5 1.3
35 1.3 0.6 1.7 0.9 2.3 1.3
40 1.2 0.6 1.7 0.9 2.3 1.3
45 1.4 0.6 1.9 0.9 2.5 1.3
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Table 7. 	 The relative change in the one year probabilities for
transitions into employment when the woman gets one year
of additional schooling.
Husbands
income
(NOK)
50.000 100.000 150.000
Number
of
children
Years of
school-
ing 9 18 9 18 9 18
0 - 16
years
Age
--
20 .16 - .18 - .21 -
25 .11 .06 .14 .08 .17 .11
30 .08 .03 .11 .05 .13 .07
0 35 .06 .03 .09 .05 .11 .06
40 .06 .03 .08 .05 .11 .06
45 .07 .03 .09 .05 .13 .06
25 .15 .08 .17 .11 .20 .13
30 .11 .05 .13 .07 .17 .09
35 .09 .04 .11 .06 .15 ..09
40 .08 .04 .11 .06 .15 .09
45 .09 .04 .13 .06 .17 .09
Table 8 'shows the effect of childbearing. This effect is
largest for highly educated women with husbands income equal to 50 000
NOK and it is lowest for low educated women with husbands income equal
to 150 000 NOK.
Table 8. The relative change in the one year probabilities for
transitions out of employment when the woman gets one
child during the year.
Husbands
income
(NOK)
50.000 100.000 150.000
Number
of
children
Years of
school-
ing 9 18 9 18 9 18
0 - 16
years
Age
20 .50 - .36 - .25 -
25 .72 1.03 .58 .91 .44 .76
30 .81 1.00 .70 .93 .57 .83
O 35 .79 .91 .71 .87 .61 .81
40 .73 .82 .67 .79 .66 .74
25 .57 - .43 .31
30 .69 .92 .57 .83 .44 .71
35 .70 .86 .61 .80 .50 .72
40 .66 .79 .58 .74 .49 .68
In table 9 we have computed
alog p ( t-1,t)1 	alog p i ( t)
alog gOt 	 alo g got
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for some selected values of the explanatory variables by using (5.4).
Table 9. Elasticities of the transitions probabilities, p 2 (t-1,t),1
with respect to the demand g
ot 
compared to the elastisities
of p i (t)
Husbands
income
(NOK)
50.000 • 	 100.000 150.000
Number
of
children
Years of
school-
ing 9 18 9 18 9 18
0 - 16
years
Age
,
20 2.9 - 2.8 - 2.8 -
25 3.3 3.8 3.2 3.5 3.0 3.3
, 30 3.5 4.5 3.4 3.6 3.3 3.5
O 35 3.6 4.0 3.6 4.6 3.4 3.8
40 3.7 4.0 3.6 5.1 3.7 4.0
45 3.7 4.0 3.6 5.1 3.8 3.8
25 3.1 5.1 3.0 5.1 3.0 4.5
30 3.4 4.6 3.2 4.6 3.2 3.7
35 3.4 3.8 3.4 3.8 3.5 3.7
40 3.4 3.8 3.6 3.8 3.7 3.7
45 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 	 - 3.8 3.7
7.
	Final Remarks. 
The model we have discussed above posesses several tractable
properties. First, it allows an interpretation of the parameters in
terms of an underlying behavioral theory for the individual. Second,
the relationship between the transition intensities and the transition
probabilities for arbitrary time intervals is simple, even in the
general inhomogeneous case where the parameters depend on time (age).
For general Markov chain models the transition probabilities are
complicated functions of the transition intensities that can often not
be expressed on closed form. The Markov chain model proposed here
merits, therefore, particular interest even if the viewpoint is solely
practicallity and technical convenience.
In 	 the 	 process of developing and testing theories of
individual behavior the present framework offers a natural class of
models as the point of departure.
A well known problem in the analysis of longitudinal data is
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to discriminate between unobserved heterogeneity and structural state
dependence (Heckman, 1981). Structural state dependence is a notion
for the effect of the previous labor market career on the current
preferences. Unobserved heterogeneity enters at the level of the
observer because he does not observe all the variables that influences
the individual's preferences. From the observer's point of view both
structural state dependence effects as well as unobserved
heterogeneity may lead to dependence on previous labor market career
at the aggregate level. The analysis above assumes that no structural
state dependence effects are present nor is there any unobserved
transition costs. However, such effects could be incorporated into the
model by letting, for example, the systematic part of the reservation
wage function depend on labor market experience, transition cost
parameters, etc. Unfortunately, such extensions will in general break
down the simple relationship between transition intensities (given the
previous career) and the state/transition probabilities.
The empirical part of the paper is somewhat insatisfactory
because we have not estimated the model rigorously from combined time
series/crossection data that includes the proper economic variables
such as savings. In our model essentially all the parameters, apart
from one, 8, have been estimated from a single cross-section.
Finally, we like to stress that, although we have advocated a
strategy for integrating the random and the systematic parts of the
model into a unified framework justified by theory there are however
essential shortcomings in our approach. Unfortunately, many and
possibly important assumptions have been made for mathematical
convenience and are typically unjustified from a behavioral point of
view. To strengthen the theoretical underpinnings and remove some of
the ad hoc assumptions remains an important challenge for future
research.
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Appendix 1 
In this appendix we demonstrate that the utility function,
U (4), specified by (2.8), (3.1) and (3.3) is continuously
differentiable in tit with probability one. We have
(A.1) Ut (4)= Pt (4) maxzy(14(z),T(z))K t (W(z),11,T(z))e(z).
If we assume that pt (4) is continuously differentiable in 4 we only
have to prove that
(A.2) U.1.) 	 max zy (W(z),T(z))Kt (W(z),11,T(z))e(z)
is continuously differentiable. The distribution of the derivative,
f(p.,x), is defined by (if it exists)
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U*41') - U*(1. )
f(4,x) = P{ 	 lim
	f	 i < x
	' LI
	
tit 	 -
Let 	 be the value of z at which the right hand side of (A.2)
attains 	 its maximum. Assume that for some neighbourhood, N 40, of
we have
P{Kt (4(7(1) ), w, Tri(4)) . 1 	 1
for 11 1 E NW. This assumption implies that U* (ti) is continuous in
probability and that
* 	 *
Ut (W) - Ut
with probability one. Accordingly we get that
W(p.) 	 W(11) Ui)t 	 t 	 t
with probability one,which completes the demonstration.
Appendix 2 
In this appendix we shall outline a proof of (4.11). Let
Z(t) 	 log Z(t)J 	 J
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Z( t)}where Z(t) is defined by (3.5). According to de Haan (1984),
J
is a max-stable process and it is easily verified that
P{ Zt (t) S. x } = exp(: exp ( J 
where 	 -
d 1 (t) = log(g g u ) 	 d 2 (t) = log(g2t 2tOt lt lt ' •
By assumtion the sets Bit are nondecreasing. Let
A(st) = max [log vt (W(z),T(z))+log e(z) ]
za.(t)-B.(s)
then it follows that
Z(t) = max( Z(s), A(st))
J 	 J 	 J
and that A(st) has distribution of. the type
J
5.(s,t) - x
exp(-exp( J 	))
a
for a suitable 8 ,. s,t
Moreover since (B. (t) 	 B. (s)) n B (s) 	 0, A(s,t) is independent of
J 	 J
zt (s). But this means that {Z* (t)} belongs to the subclass of
J 	 J
max-stable processes called inhomogeneous extremal processes. Now
Theorem 13 of Dagsvik (1983) yields that {J(t)} is a Markey chain with
transition probabilities given by
d.(s) - d.(t) + n(s) - n(t)
p ij (s,t) = p.(t)(1 - e JJ
and
1 (st) ,  = 1 - 	 ..(st
	
, 	 i0j
which coincide with (4.11). This completes the proof.
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